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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KELLY RAY DEBOARD,

:

Case No. 980387-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JTJRISPICTIQNAIi STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1998) , in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the
Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction

is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (judgment and conviction) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Is Deboard!s sentence invalid where the trial court

sentenced him to 365 days in jail outside the presence of
appointed counsel and without apprising him of his right to the
presence of counsel?
Standard Q £ Review:

n

[T]he determination that a defendant

has intelligently waived his right to counsel !turns !upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused,'1 the constitutionality of an accused1s waiver of the
right to counsel is a mixed question involving both fact and
law."

State V. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 780 (Utah App. 1996)

(quotations omitted) (citing State v. Tenn^y. 913 P.2d 750, 753
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Penar 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Kelly Ray Deboard's ("Deboard") issue is preserved
on the record for appeal (!,R.ff) at 61[3-7].
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statute and constitutional provisions are
determinative of the issues on appeal:
Rights of Accused, United States Const. Amend. VI (1991):
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Rights of Accused Persons, Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (Supp. 1998) :
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel.
Rights of Defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1995) :
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: (a)
To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Kelly Ray Deboard ("Deboard") was charged by
information with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998) and an arrest warrant
was issued.

R.3-5. Deboard was appointed counsel from the Salt

Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA").

R.10. On December 23,

1997, he entered a guilty plea to attempted possession of a
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) . R.39.
2

Prior to sentencing, Deboard was appointed substitute
counsel from LDA when his original attorney left that office.
R.32.

The new attorney entered her appearance with the court on

March 20, 1998. Id.
Meanwhile, Deboard was referred to ("AP&P") on December 23,
1997, to prepare a sentencing report.

R.15. A sentencing

hearing was also set for February 25, 1998. R.18. As of
February 16, 1998, Deboard had not reported to AP&P.
also missed the February 25th hearing.

R.15.

He

R.19,20. An arrest

warrant was issued on March 2, 1998. R.20.

However, the warrant

was recalled on March 12, 1998, since Deboard missed the hearing
on account of a snow storm and impassable roads. R.28,61[4].
A second sentencing hearing was set for April 3, 1998.
R.29.

Deboard still had not reported to AP&P as of March 25th.

R.30.

He also failed to appear for the sentencing hearing and

later explained that he did not receive notice of the new date.
R.61[4] . No warrant was issued upon Deboard1s failure to appear
at the April 3rd hearing.

R.61[4-5].

The sentencing date was reset for May 13, 1998. R.33.
Deboard appeared for sentencing this time, but had not met with
AP&P beforehand.

R.34,36.

Deboard was not accompanied by his

attorney and, in fact, did not know the attorney1s name on
account of the earlier change in counsel.

R.61[3].

Even though Deboard was not accompanied by his attorney, the
judge did not inform Deboard of his right to the presence of his
attorney at sentencing, nor did he ascertain whether Deboard
3

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived the right before
proceeding with the hearing.

R.61[3-7].

Instead, the judge

immediately asked Deboard why he did not report to AP&P. R.61[36].

Deboard explained that he had an attorney, although he did

not know her name.

R.61[3].

He also explained that he had been

in contact with "law enforcement" in an effort to "get these
matters resolved."

R.61[6].

Rather than granting a third continuance in order that
Deboard may locate his attorney and meet with AP&P to finish the
report, the judge sentenced Deboard to 365 days in jail.
Deboard requested "private counsel" upon the judge!s

R.39,61[6].
sentence.

R.61[6].

Rather than honoring Deboard!s request, the

judge reiterated the sentence and set a review date for June 19,
1998.

R.61[7].

On June 19, Deboard and his attorney appeared

for the review, at which time the court suspended the remaining
300 days in jail and placed Deboard on probation for three years.
R.52-53,55.

Deboard appeals from the sentence. R.56.
ARGUMENT

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEBOARD BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
TNVAT.TD WHERE THE COURT IMPOSED THE SENTENCE OUTSIDE THE
PRESENCE OF APPOINTED COUNSEL AND WITHOUT ESTABLISHING VALID
WAIVER..
The trial court erred as a matter of law in sentencing
Deboard where it failed to conduct a searching colloquy that
established that Deboard was aware of his right to the presence
of his attorney or that he waived such right knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily.

Moreover, the circumstances of

4

the case do not evince Deboard's appreciation of his right or
valid waiver thereof.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that a
criminal defendant has the right to the presence and effective
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal
proceeding where substantial rights may be affected, including
sentencing.

£££ Mempa v. Rhay. 389 U.S. 128, 137, 88 S.Ct. 254,

19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) (right to counsel under Sixth Amendment
"extends to sentencing" since substantial rights of accused are
at stake) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252,
92 L.Ed. 1690) (1948)); Kuehnert v. Turner. 499 P.2d 839, 840-41
(Utah 1972) (Article I Section 12 of Utah Constitution guarantees
right to presence of counsel at sentencing unless defendant
executes a valid waiver) (citations omitted) (see Addendum B copy of opinion); State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah App.
1996) (sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceeding
necessitating right to counsel); State v. Casarez r 656 P.2d 1005,
1007 (Utah 1982) (same); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a)
(1995) ("[i]n criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
[t]o . . . defend in person or by counsel").
A defendantf s right to the presence of counsel at sentencing
exists on account of the particular impact that sentencing has on
a defendants liberty.

As noted by the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals, a defendant's "ultimate fate is [often] determined more
by [sentencing] than the determination of guilt or innocence."
5

United States v. Salerno. 61 F.3d 214, 220-22 (3d Cir. 1995).
Hence, the presence of counsel at sentencing is "one of the most
fundamental and cherished rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
Id.

Moreover, it is "necessary to insure fundamental human

rights of life and liberty."

Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 58

S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
Some of the pitfalls faced by a defendant at sentencing
necessitating the aid of counsel include complex guidelines
wherein the judge may consider any relevant information and not
just the "conduct that constitutes the offense of conviction. . .
. In addition, a defendant who is unfamiliar with the post
conviction process may inadvertently waive a meritorious argument
that he/she might otherwise have raised on appeal."

Id.; see

also Salerno. 61 F.3d at 220 ("sentencing is a critical and often
times complicated part of the criminal process that contains
subtleties which may be beyond the appreciation of the average
layperson").

Hence, the aid of counsel is necessary

so that [a defendant has] a real opportunity to present to
the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendants conduct, as well as to
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's
past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its
administration and enforcement of penal laws.

Kiehnert, 499 p.2d at 840-41.
In light of the foregoing considerations, a sentence is
sustainable on appeal only if the trial court conducts a colloquy
on the record establishing that an unrepresented defendant
understands his right to the presence of counsel, and that he
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his right before
6

proceeding with sentencing.

&££ Edwards V. Arizona/ 451 U.S.

477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("waivers of
counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege").

Alternatively, a sentence is valid if the

totality of the circumstances reflected in the record evince the
defendant's knowledge of his right to counsel, as well as his
voluntary and intelligent waiver thereof.

Id. (waiver may be

inferred from totality of circumstances). Deboard's sentence is
invalid because neither a colloquy conducted by the court nor
other circumstances in the record establish that he understood
his right and voluntarily waived it before the judge imposed
sentence.
In a case factually similar to the case at bar, the Utah
Supreme Court in Kuehnert invalidated a sentence under Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution because the sentencing judge
failed to inform the defendant of his right to an attorney, and
circumstances of the case did not otherwise establish a valid
waiver.

499 P.2d at 841-42.

The Court reasoned that the

appellant, a habeas corpus petitioner, was not accompanied by his
attorney at his sentencing hearing.

Id. at 841. Moreover, the

record showed that Kuehnert was represented by an attorney when
he entered his guilty plea and that "there was no entry of
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing."

Id. at 839.

In

addition, "[a]t the time of sentencing the trial court neither
advised [Kuehnert] of his right to counsel nor made inquiry as to
7

why counsel was not present."

Id.

Rather, "the court merely

queried whether it was [Kuehnert's] desire not to wait but to be
sentenced immediately, to which [Kuehnert] responded
affirmatively."

Id. at 840. The court then sentenced Kuehnert.

Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
sentence and remanded for a new hearing since the court neither
informed Kuehnert of his right to the presence of counsel nor
established waiver of such right.

Id. at 840-41.

The Supreme

Court also noted that "since [Kuehnert] was not informed of his
right to the presence of counsel, there is no ground upon which
to predicate a waiver of this right."

Id. at 840 (citing In re

Haror 458 P.2d 500, 506 (Ca. 1969) ("we cannot condone . . . the
failure of the trial court to reinform defendant of his right to
counsel when he appeared for the first time without his counsel
for sentencing, nor can we countenance the trial court's failure
to require defendant's waiver of his right to counsel in open
court before the rendition of sentence").
In light of Kuehnert and the other foregoing authority,
Deboard's sentence is invalid because neither a colloquy nor
other circumstances evident from the record establish that
Deboard understood his right to the presence of an attorney, nor
intelligently, knowingly or voluntarily waived such right before
the court proceeded with the hearing.
First, like Kuehnert. the record is devoid of any meaningful
or timely communication from the court regarding Deboard's right
8

to his attorney's assistance at the hearing, let alone a colloquy
establishing a valid waiver.

See 499 P.2d at 840-41.

In

informing a defendant of his right to counsel and establishing
intelligent and voluntary waiver, a court is not required to
carry on a "rote dialogue."

Salerno, 61 F.3d at 220.

Recognizing

that "sentencing hearings demand much less specialized knowledge
than trials," the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "the
inquiry at sentencing need only be tailored to that proceeding .
. . [and] need not be as exhaustive and searching as a similar
inquiry [at] trial."

Id. at 219.

"Nevertheless, sentencing is a critical and often times
complicated part of the criminal process that contains subtleties
which may be beyond the appreciation of the average layperson,"
wherein an unrepresented defendant may "inadvertently waive a
meritorious argument," and which often times has more impact on a
defendant's "ultimate fate" than the "determination of guilt"
itself.

Id. at 220; see supra 5-6 (discussing complexities of

sentencing necessitating assistance of counsel).

"Given these

intricacies, it is particularly important that a sentencing court
be certain that a defendant understands the perilous path he/she
is going down [during] sentencing without benefit of counsel."
Salernor 61 F.3d at 220.
Accordingly, "at a minimum, a trial judge must make 'a
searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him[/her] that the
defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary, . . . [and]
calculated to insure that the defendant is 'made aware of the
9

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that 'he[/she] knows what he[/she] is doing
and [the] choice is made with eyes wide open.'1"1

Id. (quoting

Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann. 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed.2d 268) (1942)).
Moreover, a sentencing court must "indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver."

Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387,

404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).
The following exchange demonstrates how the court proceeded
to confront the unaccompanied Deboard regarding the substance of
the issue underlying the court's decision to jail him, i.e. his
delay in completing a presentence report, and then sentence
Deboard to jail before the judge mentioned his attorney for the
first time.
1

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,
187 (Utah 1987), noted with regard to the defendant's right to
counsel at trial that it is the court's duty to ensure that a
defendant
waives his right knowingly,
intelligently
and
voluntarily.
To this end, the Frampton Court expressed a
preference for a "colloquy on the record, " as opposed to an ad hoc
discourse. Id. at 187-88. Absent a colloquy, there is a greater
risk that a defendant's challenge based on the right to counsel
will succeed on appeal if, under the totality of the circumstances,
the record does not strongly evince the defendant's "actual
awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se." Id. at 188.
Generally, [a valid waiver] can only be elicited after
penetrating questioning by the trial court. Therefore, a
colloquy on the record between the court and the accused is
the preferred method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver
because it insures that defendants understand the risks of
self-representation. Moreover, it is the most efficient means
by which appeals may be limited.
IdL at 187.
10

(R.61E3])
Court: Mr. Deboard, we were to impose sentence here today
and Ifve received a note that you have not gone over for a
presentence report.
Defendant: I was -- went down and got the papers last time
I left court, they said to call the number that was on the
presentence report or I could just mail it in. It's
supposed to be handled by Wade Smith. And I don't know who
my attorney is because my other one I guess she had her last
day right before my last court date, they told me that day
that it was Debbie or something.

Court: I think this is about the second time we've
continued your sentencing; is that right?
Deboard:

This is correct.

(R.61[41)
Court: Let's see, so you entered a plea [on December 23] .
. . and failed to appear on the 25th of February [to
complete the sentencing report.]
Deboard: Yeah, that's when we got snowed up in the canyon.
And I had called the courts and was supposed to come in and
get a court date and I thought they were going to mail me a
court date.

Court: And we set the sentencing over to . . . the 3rd of
April and you didn't report for the presentence report?
Deboard:

I had no idea that I was supposed to.

Court: So this would be our third (R.61[5]) continuance [if
we granted your request] today?
Deboard:
Court:

It would.
I'm hesitant to do that.

What I'm going

to do

is

set another sentencing date but order that you be held in
the county jail until I impose sentence.
AP&P will come and
visit you in the county jail.

11

Deboard:
Court:

I -- is there a -- can I get private

counsel?

You can hire your own lawyer if you like. . . . But

we have a legal defender who will represent you in the case
. . . who has already contacted the clerk of the court.
Deboard:

Could I speak with you about these in private?

Court: I can't speak with you in private.
speak here on the record here in court.

If you want to

(R.61[6])
Deboard: I've been working with
cases, they are supposed to have
been trying to get these matters
now and they have -- you know, I
with--

law enforcement in some
contacted you guys. I've
resolved for a long time
don't know what's going on

Court: Well, all I know is I haven't been contacted
recently by law enforcement.
Deboard:

You can talk to Detective Odor.

Court: But nonetheless, . . . this is the third time around
for us. I just don't think we can do that anymore. We need
to get this case resolved. . . . [Y]ou haven't gone over for
the presentence reports. I've ordered you to do things that
you have not done and we're in a situation here where I've
got to impose sentence and I have incomplete information
here.
Deboard: I've really been trying to d o Court: It's not that tough. All you have to do is go over
to the presentence office . . . and then (R.61[7]) they'll
tell you a time to come back and sit down and talk with
them.
Deboard:
report to
he's been
I've been

The told me that I could mail my presentence
them. I've talked to Mr. Witchman over at AP&P,
involved with Odor and myself and several others.
really trying to get this thing resolved.

Court: Well, I'm ordering you serve a term of 365 days in
jail. I will review the decision which I have made on the
19th of June. . . . Thank you. [Hearing concluded].
R.61[3-7] (emphasis added).
The foregoing exchange does not amount to the sort of
12

searching inquiry, "calculated to insure" that Deboard1s waiver
was "understanding and voluntary," contemplated by Salerno and
similar cases.

Salerno, 61 F.3d at 220.

For instance, the court

never formally informed the unaccompanied Deboard of his right to
the presence of counsel in the first place.

In fact, the judge

only mentioned Deboard's attorney after he imposed sentence and
upon Deboard1s contemporaneous request for "private counsel."
R.61[5] . As stated in Kuehnert. where a defendant is "not
informed of his right to the presence of counsel, there is no
ground upon which to predicate a waiver of that right."

499 P.2d

at 840. The same is true for the instant case -- where Deboard
was not informed of his right to the presence of counsel in the
first place, a valid waiver cannot be established.

Id.

Consequently, the trial court erred as a matter of law in
proceeding with the hearing and the sentence imposed is invalid.

The trial court's error in failing to inform Deboard of his
right to the presence of counsel in the first place is
underscored given several warning signals that the court had
indicating the need to re-inform Deboard of his right in this
case.

First, the very fact that Deboard appeared alone should

have alerted the trial court to the necessity of informing
Deboard of his right. As noted by Justice Black of the United
States Supreme Court, a judge must exercise heightened
sensitivity for a defendants rights when that defendant stands
alone before the court.

See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708,
13

722, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) ("[i]t is the solemn duty
of a [] judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to
make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure
the fullest protection of [the right to counsel]11).
Additionally, the court should have been alerted to its duty
given that the court knew Deboard had appointed counsel at the
time of the hearing.

Not only did the trial court acknowledge

that Deboard had a "legal defender" after it imposed sentence,
R.61[5], but Deboard himself noted at the beginning of the
hearing that he had an attorney although he did not know her
name.

R.61[3].

Moreover, the court knew that Deboard was

represented by an attorney when he entered his guilty plea and
had at no time prior to sentencing moved to withdraw counsel from
his case.

See Kuenhert. 499 P.2d at 839 (invalidating sentence

base in part on fact that sentencing court failed to inform
defendant of his right to the presence of counsel even though
judge knew defendant was represented when he entered guilty plea
and defendant did not subsequently move to withdraw counsel prior
to sentencing).

Finally, Deboard's new attorney had properly

entered her appearance as substitute counsel on March 23, 1998,
almost two months before the sentencing hearing.

R.32.

In sum,

the court's error in imposing sentence is underscored by
foregoing, obvious warning signals highlighting the need to
inform Deboard of his right to the presence of counsel at the
hearing.
Even assuming that the sentencing court had at least
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informed Deboard of his right to the presence of his attorney,
the sentence would still fail because the exchange between the
judge and Deboard is lacking in any conversation regarding
Deboardrs understanding of his right or indications that he
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived it.

Id. at 841.

As evidenced by the sentencing hearing transcript, the judge
began to question Deboard about his delay in completing the
sentencing report before he mentioned Deboardfs attorney for the
first time.

R.61[3-5].

Just after the judge indicated that he

would incarcerate Deboard, Deboard, of his own volition,
requested "private counsel."

R.61[5].

At that time, the court

only mentioned that Deboard had a "legal defender who would
represent you in the case."

Id.

The judge did not clarify on

the record with Deboard that he had a right to his attorney in
this

hearing in particular.

He likewise failed to ascertain

whether Deboard understood the risks involved in proceeding
without his attorney, and based on that understanding whether he
voluntarily agreed to proceed without her.

Where the record

lacks any clarifying colloquy between Deboard and the court, the
judge failed to establish a constitutionally valid waiver,
rendering Deboard's sentence invalid under Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution, Kuehnertr 499 P.2d at 841, and the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

See Salerno,

61 F.3d at 221 (invalidating sentence under Sixth Amendment where
sentencing judge failed to establish waiver on record).
In addition to the absence of a clear colloquy, the trial
15

court erred as a matter of law in imposing sentence where the
overall circumstances likewise fail to establish that Deboard
understood his right to the presence of counsel or that he
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived such right.
First, the record establishes that Deboard actually requested his
attorney and never waived such right. As noted above, Deboard
mentioned his attorney at the beginning of the hearing.

R.61[3].

While Deboard's mention of his attorney was not an unequivocal
request for her presence, under the circumstances, the judge
should have been alerted to the fact that Deboard might want her
assistance at the hearing and accordingly inform him of his
right.

In any event, Deboard unequivocally requested an attorney

after the judge stated he would incarcerate Deboard.

R.61[5].

At that time the judge definitely should have known to establish
Deboard's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver before
sentencing him to jail.
In addition to Deboard's request for an attorney, Deboard
expressed genuine alarm and was hesitant to carry on with the
hearing without his attorney once the judge stated that he would
place him in jail.

Id.

For example, Deboard seemed to lose his

train of thought and began to stutter once the judge indicated
that he would incarcerate him.

IdL; see Salerno. 61 F.3d at 221

(invalidating sentence of unrepresented defendant in part because
defendant expressed reluctance in proceeding; "defendant's
apparent reluctance to proceed without counsel should have
alerted the court to the need to inform [him of his right and to
16

establish waiver]").

These facts alone bear against any finding

the court may have made that Deboard waived his right to the
presence of an attorney and voluntarily proceeded without her.
The trial court's error is compounded, however, given that
Deboard did not exhibit any sort of courtroom experience or
education on the record that might lead the court to believe that
he understood his right to counsel and yet proceeded voluntarily.
See, e.g.. United States v. Verkulien. 690 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.
1982) (waiver, although not explicit, established where defendant
was a law student, expressed understanding of his right to
counsel at sentencing, and appeared willing to proceed
unrepresented); State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 783-84 (Utah
App. 1996) (valid waiver of counsel at trial established where
judge ascertained on the record that defendant understood
charges, penalties, technicalities and rules of trial and had
previously represented himself).

If anything, Deboard seemed

somewhat confused, albeit in earnest, about the procedure
involved in completing the sentencing report.

For example,

Deboard was confused about his new attorney's name.

R.61[3].

He

explained that he was in touch with "law enforcement . . . trying
to get these matters resolved for sometime."

R.61[6].

He even

gave the names of particular officers who he assumed would be in
contact with the court.

R.61[3,7].

In fact, according to the

judge, Deboard was supposed to report directly to AP&P to
complete the necessary report.

R.61[5-7].

Where Deboard

demonstrated a lack of courtroom experience and misunderstood the
17

procedure involved in completing the report, the trial court
erred in proceeding with the sentencing hearing.

Cf. McDonald,

922 P.2d at 783-84 (valid waiver where defendant exhibited
understanding of charges and trial procedure).2
The fact that Deboard's delay in completing the report was
the impetus for sentencing him to jail further underscores the
court's error in this case.

Given Deboard's confused approach

toward completing the necessary report, the court should have
been all the more sensitive to the need to ensure that Deboard
understood his right to the assistance of counsel during the
confrontation between Deboard and the judge.

As evidenced by the

record, the sum of the judge's discourse, and the reasoning
behind the jail sentence, concerned Deboard's delay in completing
the report.

Without the benefit of counsel, Deboard did not have

"a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation

2

Even if the judge subjectively felt that Deboard understood
his right to the presence of counsel, appreciated the
technicalities of the hearing, and voluntarily and intelligently
waived such right, the sentence is nonetheless invalid since the
judge did not establish his subjective beliefs on the record. As
noted by the Salerno Court, "[w]e appreciate that the sentencing
judge (who also conducted Salerno's trial) may have felt that he had
sufficient familiarity with this defendant to accept a waiver of
counsel for purposes of sentencing without a searching inquiry into
Salerno's familiarity with, or appreciation of, the complexities of
sentencing. . . . However, we cannot infer a valid waiver of the
right to counsel based upon the district court's subjective overall
impression
We have previously stated 'that a colloquy . . .
is the preferred method of ascertaining that a waiver is knowing,
voluntary and intelligent.' . . . We reiterate that 'it is
appropriate for this searching inquiry to appear on the record' so
as to allow a reviewing court to examine the district court's
determination in the event of an appeal. . . . [FJailure to do this
requires a remand for resentencing." 61 F.3d at 221 (quotations
omitted).
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of . . . or in explanation of the [his] conduct, as well as to
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's past
record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its
administration and enforcement of penal laws."

Kuehnertr 499

P.2d at 840-41.
As noted by the Salerno Court, a sentencing court need not
allow itself to be "manipulated into granting a continuance."

61

F.3d at 221. Nonetheless, it is still obliged to insure that the
defendant is informed of his right to the presence of counsel and
executes a valid waiver before proceeding.

Id.

Indeed, the

court in this case could have avoided any perceived manipulation
by Deboard by simply calling Legal Defender's office.

In doing

so, the court could have kept Deboard in its presence and at the
same time locate Deboard's attorney.3

In the end, Deboard's

right to the presence of counsel would have been honored.
As a final matter, the trial court's error in this case,
i.e. the denial of Deboard's constitutional right to the presence
of counsel, amounts to "constitutional error" and is therefore
presumptively prejudicial, requiring remand.

The United States

Supreme Court has uniformly found constitutional error without
any showing of prejudice when, as in the instant case, counsel
was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.

See, e.g.r

fleriers v. United States. 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d
3

Although not reflected in the record, trial counsel
indicated that she was in the courthouse while Deboard's sentencing
hearing was underway.
19

592 (1976); Herring v. New York. 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45
L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-613,
92 S.Ct. 1891, 1895, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972); Hamilton v. Alabama.
368 U.S. 52, 55, 82 S.Ct. 157, 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); White
v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 1051, 10 L.Ed.2d 193
(1963) (per curiam); Ferguson v. Georgia. 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct.
756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961); Williams v. Kaiser. 323 U.S. 471,
475-476, 65 S.Ct. 363, 366, 89 L.Ed. 398 (1945).

The complete

denial of the assistance of counsel is constitutional error
because "impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy
to identify and, for that reason and because the [government] is
directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent."

Strickland v. Washington. 466 u.s. 668, 692, 104 s.ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (citing United States v. Tronic. 466 U.S. 648,
664 and n.25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)).
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals likewise
found presumptive constitutional error, and remanded for
resentencing, in a factually similar case where the defendant was
sentenced without benefit of counsel.
F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (11th Cir. 1985).

Seefloldenv. Newsome. 755
Based on the principals of

an adversarial system, wherein "partisan advocacy on both sides
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective [of justice],"
and in light of the particular complexities inherent in
sentencing, the Golden Court held the defendant's sentence to be
"constitutionally infirm" on account of the wholesale denial of
his right to the assistance of counsel.
20

Id. at 484.

"The Sixth

Amendment recognizes the right to counsel because effective
counsel plays a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results.

In this case, the

justice of Mr. Golden1s sentence has been rendered unreliable by
a total breakdown in the adversary process at the sentencing
stage of his trial.

Having failed to pass through the crucible

of meaningful adversarial testing, the sentence must be vacated."

For the reasoning set forth above, Deboard's sentence is
likewise rendered "constitutionally infirm" on account of the
trial court's actions, which served to deny Deboard his right to
the presence of counsel at his sentencing.

Without counsel, he

too was denied a meaningful opportunity his case for a more
lenient sentence.

"Having failed to pass through the crucible of

meaningful adversarial testing,"

Deboard's sentence is

presumptively invalid and the matter should be remanded.

Id.

In sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in
proceeding with the sentencing hearing where Deboard was
unrepresented by counsel.

The court failed to conduct a colloquy

on the record which would establish Deboard's understanding of
his right to the presence of counsel and that he voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived such right.

Moreover, the

circumstances of the case as reflected in the record do not
establish that Deboard understood or validly waived his right.
Accordingly, Deboard's sentence is invalid under the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 12
21

of the Utah Constitution.

Finally, the trial court's error,

which served to deny Deboard of his right to the presence of
counsel altogether, amounts to presumptively prejudicial
constitutional error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Deboard respectfully requests this
Court to vacate and remand the sentence.
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ADDENDUM B

499 P.2d 839, 28 Utah 2d 150, Kuehnert v. Turner, (Utah 1972)
*839 499 P.2d 839
28 Utah 2d 150
Max KUEHNERT, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State Prison,
Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 12656.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 18, 1972.
Prisoner petitioner for writ of habeas corpus. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., entered order denying petition and the
petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister,
C.J., held that where defendant was represented by
counsel at time his plea of guilty was entered and
there was no entry as to withdrawal of counsel prior
to sentencing at which defendant appeared without
counsel and without receiving advice as to his right
to counsel, absence of counsel rendered sentence
invalid and cause would be remanded with directions
to proceed to fix date for pronuncing sentence in
proper manner.
Remanded with directions.
Ellett, J., concurred in the result and filed an
opinion.
1. CRIMINAL LAW <®==>988
110 —
110XXIII Judgment, Sentence, and Final
Commitment
110k985 Formalities in Pronouncing Sentence
110k988
Presence of counsel.
Utah 1972.
Since habeas corpus petitioner was not informed of
his right to the presence of counsel at time of
sentencing, there was no ground upon which to
predicate a waiver of this right by him. Const, art.
1, Sees. 12, 13.
2. CRIMINAL LAW <®^988
110 —
110XXIII Judgment, Sentence, and Final
Commitment
110k985 Formalities in Pronouncing Sentence
110k988
Presence of counsel.
Utah 1972.
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It is necessary to have counsel present at time of
hearing so that there is a real opportunity to present
to court facts in extenuation of offense or in
explanation of defendant's conduct, to correct any
errors or mistakes in reports of defendant's past
record and to appeal to equity of court in its
administration and enforcement of penal laws.
Const, art. 1, Sees. 12, 13; U.C.A.1953, 77-35-17.
3. CRIMINAL LAW <®=>980(1)
110 —110XXIII Judgment, Sentence, and Final
Commitment
110k980 Sentence on Pleas of Guilty or Nolo
Contendere
110k980(l) In general.
Formerly HOkl 181
[See headnote text below]
3. CRIMINAL LAW <©^ 1181.5(8)
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(U) Determination and Disposition of
Cause
HOkl 181.5 Remand in General; Vacation
HOkl 181.5(3) Remand for Determination or
Reconsideration of Particular Matters
HOkl 181.5(8) Sentence.
Utah 1972.
Where defendant was represented by counsel at
time his plea of guilty was entered and there was no
entry as to withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing
at which defendant appeared without counsel and
without receiving advice as to his right to counsel,
absence of counsel rendered sentence invalid and
cause would be remanded with directions to proceed
to fix date for pronouncing sentence in proper
manner. Const, art. 1, Sees. 12, 13; U.C.A.1953,
77-35-17.
[28 UTAH2D 150] Margret S. Taylor, Salt Lake
Legal Defender Assn., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David S. Young,
David R. Irvine, Asst. Attys. Gen., [28 UTAH2D
151] Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court
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499 P.2d 839, 28 Utah 2d 150, Kuehnert v. Turner, (Utah 1972)
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The trial court determined that plaintiff was
lawfully incarcerated in the Utah State Prison
pursuant to a conviction of the crime of forgery
based upon a guilty plea, knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entered, and that plaintiff's rights
were not violated by lack of counsel at the
sentencing proceeding.
On appeal plaintiff asserts that his sentence was
invalid and void on the ground that he was without
counsel at a critical stage of the criminal
proceedings, namely, at the time of sentencing.
A review of the record reveals that plaintiff was
represented by counsel at the time his plea of guilty
was entered; furthermore, there was no entry of
withdrawal of counsel prior to sentencing. At the
time of sentencing the trial court neither advised
plaintiff of his right to counsel nor made inquiry as
to why counsel was not present. In the colloquy
between the court and plaintiff, the court merely
queried *840 whether it was plaintiff's desire not
to wait but to be sentenced immediately, to which
plaintiff responded affirmatively and expressed
appreciation for prompt attention, as his stay in the
jail was 'dead time.'
[1] During the evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's
petition, the court queried whether the State desired
to show a waiver by plaintiff of counsel at the
sentencing The State responded negatively. The
State was of the opinion that lack of counsel at the
sentencing constituted harmless error. The issue of
waiver was, therefore, not presented to the trial
court. However, it should be observed that since
plaintiff was not informed of his right to the
presence of counsel, there is no ground upon which
ot predicate a waiver of this right. (FN1)
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah,
provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, . . . .
In the case of In re Boyce, (FN2) the court held
that under Article I, Section 13, of [28 UTAH2D
152] the Constitution of California, which is
substantially similar to Article I, Section 12, of the
Constitution of Utah, a defendant was entitled to

Page 2

counsel when judgment was pronounced and
sentence imposed. The court held the judgment
must be set aside and the matter remanded for
resentencing with counsel present, where it appeared
that defendant had been represented by counsel at all
prior stages of the proceedings but was without
counsel at the time the judgment and sentence were
pronounced. This ruling was considered particularly
applicable where there was nothing in the record to
indicate that defendant was informed of his right to
counsel or that he knew that he was entitled to the
aid of an attorney. (FN3)
In Lee v. State, (FN4) the court stated that while
there was a sharp conflict in authorities as to
whether the presence of counsel for an accsed was
necessary at the time of sentence, they thought the
better rule was that when counsel had not been
waived, the absence thereof invalidated the sentence.
The court observed that if there were any time that a
defendant on a criminal charge might be in need of
an attorney to speak in his behalf or to advise him of
his legal rights it could well be at the time of
sentencing.
In this jurisdiction,
Section 77-35-17,
U.C.A.1953, grants the trial judge power to place
the defendant on probation.
. . . The granting or withholding of probation
involves considering intangibles of character,
personality and attitude, of which the cold record
gives little inkling. These matters, which are to be
considered in connection with the prior record of
the accused, are of such nature that the problem of
probation must of necessity rest within the
discretion of the judge who hears the case. . . .
(FN5)
[2] The foregoing indicates the necessity of the
presence of counsel at the time of sentencing; so that
there is a real opportunity to present to the court
facts in extenuation of the offense or in explanation
of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any
errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's past
record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its
administration *841
and enforcement of penal
laws. (FN6)
The conflict in the authorities to which the court
made reference in Lee v. State (FN7) has been
resolved by the United States Supreme[28 UTAH2D
153] Court. In McConnell v. Rhay, (FN8) the
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court stated:
As we said in Mempa (v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88
S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336), 'the necessity for the
aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in
general aiding and assisting the defendant to
present his case as to sentence is apparent.' 389
U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 257, 19 L.Ed.2d at 341.
The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore,
be treated like the right to counsel at other stages
of adjudication.
[3] In the instant action, since the record does not
indicate that plaintiff knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel at the time of sentencing,
we are compelled to hold his sentence invalid.
However, this does not mean that the plaintiff is
entitled to an absolute discharge.
The defect in the first sentence did not inhere in
the judgment of conviction.
The defendant
pleaded guilty, and made no attack on any of the
proceedings except the sentence. Had he appealed
from the illegal sentence, as he had a right to do,
notwithstanding his plea of guilty, this court would
have set aside the sentence as void and have
remanded the case to the trial court for a valid
sentence. (Citation) There is no principle on
which it can be successfully maintained that, by
serving part of a void sentence instead of appealing
from it, but later attacking it in collateral
proceedings, the defendant can obtain immunity
from being sentenced to the judgment provided by
law. (Citation) (FN9)
This cause is remanded to the district court with
directions to proceed to fix a date for pronouncing
sentence upon plaintiff in a manner consistent with
the views herein expressed.
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ.,
concur.
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were applicable to this case, it [28 UTAH2D 154]
should not require a release of the defendant on a
habeas corpus proceeding. So far as pertinent to
this matter, that Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
At the time of the adoption of this Amendment
there was no right to counsel in the courts of
England in felony cases. In fact, it was not until
1826, 50 years after the Amendment, that a
defendant charged with felony in the courts of
England could be represented by counsel at trial.
It was a determination by the people of the 13
colonies to see that the new federal entity did not
follow the rule of the English courts which prompted
the language above quoted to be included in the
Amendment.
*842. The Amendment does not say, and it never
was meant to say that a criminal must have counsel.
All it ever said was that he had a right to have
counsel to assist him.
In this case the defendant was never denied any
right to have counsel and so I would affirm the trial
court in what was done. However, I can see no
harm in permitting a new sentence to be imposed
upon the defendant.
FN1. See In re Haro, 71 Cal.2d 1021, 80 Cal.Rptr.
588, 594, 458 P.2d 500, 506 (1969), wherein the
court stated: '. . . we cannot condone in the
present case the failure of the trial court to
reinform defendant of his right to counsel when he
appeared for the first time without his counsel for
sentencing, nor can we countenance the trial
court's failure to require defendant's waiver of his
right to counsel in open court before the rendition
of sentence.'
FN2. 51 Cal.2d 699, 336 P.2d 164, 165 (1959).

ELLETT, Justice (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result, not because there was any
error below, but simply to avoid having the matter
taken before the federal courts, where the defendant
would be released. There is no federal question
involved in this matter. (FN1)

FN3. Also see People v. Horton, 174 Cal.App.2d
740, 345 P.2d 45, 47(1959).
FN4. 99 Ariz. 269, 408 P.2d 408, 409 (1965).
FN5. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 205, 310 P.2d
388, 393 (1957).

Even if the provisions of the Sixth Amendment
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FN6. See Martin v. United States (C.A. 5th 1950),
182 F.2d 225, 22 A.L.R.2d 1236, 1239-1240.
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FN7. Note 4, supra.

FN9. State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 72, 7 P.2d
825, 826 (1932); also see Ex Parte Folck, Folck v.
Watson, 102 Utah 470, 473, 132 P.2d 130 (1942).

FN8. 393 U.S. 2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2, 4
(1968).

FN1. See my lonesome opinion in Dyett v. Turner,
20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).
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